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Abstract 
This paper analyses whether the Calciocaos, which involved some Italian listed sport companies, impacted on the performance 
of the Dow Jones Stoxx Football index and if this was spread through shock propagation. The Calciocaos impact is assessed by 
using a cointegrated vector autoregression model. The results provide evidence of the occurrence of spreading mechanisms of 
the effects originated by the corruption episode. After this episode Juventus’ stock and Sporting’s stock have particular im-
portance in determining the performance of the Dow Jones Stoxx Football index. The investors/supporters of la Vecchia Si-
gnora revealed sentimental behaviour, and did not sell their participations. 
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1 Introduction 
Until the beginning of the 1980s, financial crises were seen as events which happened in individual markets, without a system-
ic nature. For this reason, at that time the possibility of transmission of shocks between countries or international stock markets 
merited little attention in the literature on international finance. 
During the 1990s there were changes, due to the occurrence of exogenous shocks, mainly originated by unpredictable terrorist 
attacks or corruption episodes. One of the most impressive characteristics of these crises was that related to the moment of 
their occurrence and their intensity, which did not seem to be related to stock performance. Furthermore, the negative effects 
associated with the instability caused by certain episodes were not limited to the stocks directly affected by exogenous shocks, 
being quickly transmitted through contagion over the most representative international stocks.   
It is important to study shock transmission among international stocks for different reasons. For example, contagion may have 
deep implications for portfolio management, particularly in processes of international diversification of risk. Also, there is a 
tendency towards the integration of stock markets on a worldwide basis.   
According to the literature on contagion, the limited focus of previous studies at the aggregate level which embrace the co-
movements of international financial markets should be underlined, since they are strongly concentrated on analysing the be-
haviour of stock markets in emerging economies. 
In the short term, daily data allows detection of contagion effects that could be not detected in analysis that uses less frequent 
data, and so we used daily data in this paper. This allowed us to present a different analysis in relation to the generality of con-
tagion studies which used monthly or weekly data. 
This paper is particularly related to study of the effects of a corruption episode named Calciocaos on the performance of the 
stocks of European listed sport companies, especially by analysing leading football clubs.  
The paper’s contribution to the literature on contagion and performance of sport companies is three-fold. First, it is a pioneer-
ing attempt to measure the effects of a corruption episode on the performance of hitherto neglected stocks of European listed 
sport companies. Secondly, it is an attempt to explain the changes in the stock prices of some leading clubs which belong to the 
DJ STOXX Football Index, by making a comparative analysis between two sub-samples from different time periods: before 
and after Calciocaos. Thirdly, it shows that the impact of corruption episodes on listed football club performance, rather than 
resulting in a mechanism of shock propagation, can reveal complex and emotional behaviour
2
, by investors who are simultane-
ously football supporters.   
A cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) model is applied, in order to detect cointegrating vectors and forecast the per-
formance of stocks under study. A dynamic analysis is also carried out, using block exogeneity tests to check for the existence 
of causality relationships, in a Grangerian sense. To forecast the degree of impact and correspondent signal of the causality 
relationship, coefficients of the Cholesky variance decomposition, and of the impulse response functions, are also computed. 
Before Calciocaos, the results reveal the importance of two stocks of leading European football clubs in explaining the perfor-
mance of other stocks that integrate the above-mentioned benchmark. After Calciocaos, the stock prices of Juventus lost ex-
planatory power, whereas other previously less influential stocks, such as Sporting and Porto, played an important role in ex-
plaining the performance of European listed sport companies, in a cointegrated approach.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, it reviews the literature on episodes of financial crisis and contagion, to reveal 
the missing link between corruption and contagion. Subsequently, it presents the research methodology, data and descriptive 
statistics, and econometric method. Then, it presents the empirical findings and discusses the contrasting results obtained for 
the two sub-samples used in the econometric approach. Lastly, it concludes and provides implications and guidelines for future 
research. 
 
                                                 
2 In the present paper, we consider that investors who have an emotional behaviour take decisions that with discipline they would not take. This type of inves-
tor behaviour may have unexpected effects on the performance of stocks, in the long term. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Corruption and contagion: Is there a missing link? 
Corruption is abuse of organizational responsibility or a position of authority for personal or organizational gains, in violation 
of rules or norms. The phenomenon of contagion corresponds to propagation of international economic shock waves, leading 
for example to risk aversion by investors due to the fall of stock prices, increased interest rates and a drop in demand for prod-
ucts of affected countries. In the literature up to now, the connection between these two phenomena has not been explored, 
despite the importance of analysing if cases of corruption adhere to the logic of shock transmission analogical to that portrayed 
in the literature of reference on contagion between international stock markets. 
Treisman (2000) asks why corruption is linked to countries where investment, growth and development are less, but in spite of 
empirical studies carried out so far there has been no determination of the collective, individual and emotional motivations that 
make corruption greater in some countries than others. 
Corruption is an obstacle to a country’s economic and social development (Ciocchini et al., 2003), and can be understood as 
excessive use of public functions for private ends (Vinod, 2003). It can also correspond to wrong use of organizational respon-
sibility or any position of authority for personal gain or that of a given organization (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2008). 
According to Ahlin & Pang (2008), high economic-financial development in a country contributes to lower levels of corrup-
tion. On the contrary, low economic-financial development encourages an increase of corrupt practices, increasing in this way 
the gains associated with illegal individual acts, rather than greater collective development. 
In a context of interdependence of financial and international markets, the expected effects of contagion can contribute to in-
creased corruption between bribe-takers and bribe-givers, when these agents become more daring in guaranteeing other forms 
of revenue, for example, carrying out corrupt actions from observation of others who are involved in similar deeds (Goel & 
Nelson, 2007).  
For Corsetti et al. (2000), in a scenario of international crisis, volatility of stock prices in a given market leads to changes in the 
prices of financial stocks quoted in other interdependent markets. 
In the view of Dornbusch et al. (2000), contagion corresponds to a significant increase in cross-market connections after a 
shock in a country (or in several countries), that increase being observed through the joint movements (or co-movements) of 
stock prices and financial fluxes. 
Forbes & Rigobon (2001) designate as shift-contagion an increase in cross-market connections after the occurrence of a shock 
in one economy or in a group of economies.  
Contagion can originate in financial connections between economies, especially for those highly dependent on direct foreign 
investment (Jokipii & Lucey, 2007). 
Interdependence is a phenomenon of divergence, although stability persists and there is no recorded structural change in rela-
tionships between markets. Therefore, although contagion is a phenomenon where cross-market connections are different after 
the occurence of a shock, for Jokipii & Lucey (2007), interdependence does not necessarily imply any change in the links or 
relationships between markets. 
The interdependence of links between international financial markets can be assessed through the correlation coefficients of 
cross-market connections. Therefore, a high correlation corresponds to a situation of interdependence, while a low correlation 
suggests a scenario of contagion (Fazio 2007).  
Propagation of contagion occurs through transmission channels. These can be commercial financial channels of competitive 
devaluation (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Haile & Pozo, 2007; Didier et al., 2007) or fundamentally macroeconomic (Fazio, 2007; 
Haile & Pozo, 2007). This situation is due to the fact that contagion is intrinsically related to commercial links, common exter-
nal shocks and investors’ tendency to face risk (Kumar & Persaud, 2002). However, noisy contagion can also be spread 
through financial intermediaries, namely banks (Schoenmaker, 1996). 
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However, we should not neglect the importance of herding behaviour by investors, together with risk aversion and information 
asymmetry. Indeed, in a climate of crisis, the investor can choose to reform his portfolio, so as be less exposed to risky stocks. 
In addition, information asymmetry can generate an information cascade inasmuch as investors act in their own interests, with-
out informing the issuer of shares and other investors (Haile & Pozo, 2007). 
For Guégan (2008) contagion refers to the propagation of shock waves in financial markets more than the propagation of crises 
between national economies. Those shocks affect a country’s wealth and aggregate demand, since the liquidity of financial 
markets is less and therefore affect stock prices and investment. 
Contagion is a wide concept of systemic crises which can result from an episode of propagation or a common shock affecting 
simultaneously financial and banking institutions (Gropp et al., 2009). 
In the literature, the relationships between corruption and economic-financial development are minimally explored, from both 
the theoretical and empirical point of view. However, a missing link is detected concerning study of the relationship between 
episodes of corruption and the volatility they create, with expected effects on the performance of stocks quoted in international 
stock markets. 
 
2.2 Crises and contagion 
The issue of contagion is very topical, and has been approached from different angles directed towards better understanding of 
the mechanisms and effects of transmission of crisis episodes. In this context, the studies by Schoenmaker (1996) and Forbes 
& Rigobon (2000) deserve special attention. The former carried out a pioneering measurement of contagion in the US banking 
system, revealing the need to identify the banks that can set off the so-called domino effect. In the latter, the correlation coeffi-
cients of the different markets in Latin America were analysed according to two sub-samples referring to the pre-shock and 
post-shock periods, suggesting an increase in cross-market connections after occurrence of the shock. 
In the analysis of crisis episodes motivated by investors’ panic behaviour, Baig & Goldfajn (2000) conclude on the occurence 
of shock transmission mechanisms, in the period between the Russian crisis (August 1998) and the Brazilian crisis (January 
1999). In this way, when the Russian crisis erupted, it provoked a speculative attack on the local currency by investors resident 
in Brazil. The role of foreign banks should also be highlighted, as they were one of the channels through which the Russian 
crisis was propagated in Brazil. 
Chakravorti & Lall (2004) developed a model of investment strategies whose main contribution was to demonstrate that conta-
gion is transmitted through the institutional structures of international markets. In that same line of investigation, Corsetti et al. 
(2005), Chiang et al. (2007), Haile & Pozo (2007) and Lee et al. (2007) obtained empirical evidence of contagion between the 
stock markets of emerging economies and developed economies. 
Different episodes of an anomalous nature and their impact on connections between international financial markets have been 
studied, as for example: (i) the crash of 19 October 1987 (Yang & Bessler, 2008); (ii) deconstructing the NASDAQ bubble 
(Hon et al., 2007); (iii) September 11 (Leitão & Cristóvão, 2007); and (iv) the South-East Asian Tsunami in December 2004 
(Lee et al., 2007). All episodes supply evidence of different intensities of contagion among economies or international market 
stocks. 
Although the literature detects growing concern with assessment of the impact of anomalous and exogeneous factors on the 
relationships formed among international financial markets, there is still a lack of knowledge of the mechanisms of propagat-
ing effects associated with anomalous episodes of corruption on the combined functioning of transmission channels and the 
intensity of shock transmission among international financial markets.  
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2.3 Structural changes and financial crises in European football 
In December 1995, European football was subject to great structural changes following application of the Bosman Ruling, in 
which various restrictions in the European labour market were lifted. In addition, a tendency was observed for clubs to give up 
training players, which led to the search for players in the European Union. However, this tendency has gradually been re-
versed through concentration on development of academies and schools for training new assets, i.e footballers.  
Hann et al. (2002) studied the effects of those changes in the national and international competitions in seven European coun-
tries with data starting in the 1945/1946 season, concluding on the strengthened competitive capacity of clubs from the richest 
championships, compared to clubs competing in less competitive championships. 
To evaluate the effects of changes in contract regulations and television rights on sporting performance, Barajas et al. (2005) 
analysed 34 Spanish football teams in the first and second divisions in the period 1998-2002. The authors conclude that the 
relationship between clubs’ sporting performance and their income, both from competition and television, is statistically signif-
icant. Nevertheless, the authors find evidence of poor explanatory power of economic results related to clubs’ sporting perfor-
mance. 
The effects of financial crises on the sporting results obtained in different competitions organized in Europe has been the sub-
ject of special attention in studies applied to different national championships, namely the Italian (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006), 
German (Frick & Prinz, 2006), English (Buraimo et al., 2006), Scottish (Morrow, 2006), Spanish (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006) 
and Portuguese (Barros, 2006). 
The same studies converge on the need to have a pro-efficiency orientation, i.e. for clubs to have a balanced financial situation 
in the short and medium-term, club administration should: (i) cut salaries; (ii) sell new assets – footballers; (iii) loan players; 
and (iv) transfer property to third parties. 
The success of football clubs was also studied by Berument et al. (2006), analysing the most representative Turkish football 
clubs quoted on the stock market: Galatasaray, Fenerbahce and Besiktas. The authors concluded that victories by Besiktas led 
to increased price of their shares on the stock market, contrary to what happened with the other two clubs, although this in-
crease was greater when Besiktas won away than when they won at home. 
Through analysis of the impact of a football club’s victory, defeat or draw on the same club’s quotation, Batyrbekov (2007) 
concluded that share quotations have a substantial reaction immediately after the game, accounting for an increase on return of 
1.1% in the case of a win, and a reduction of 0.6% in the case of a defeat.  
Boido & Fasano (2006) analysed the influence caused by the mood or “emotional effect” of investors on the stock performance 
of three Italian clubs: Lazio, Roma and Juventus. The authors concluded that investor behaviour is influenced positively by a 
win in an important competition. However, they found that the ratio average between price and return following a win is above 
the average ratio between price and return following a defeat. They also concluded that investors do not like games to end in a 
draw.  
More recently, Leitão (2008) analysed the effect of implementation of the regulation arising from the Taylor Report
3
 on the 
performance of the Manchester United brand. The results suggested a positive effect on the sporting performance of the most 
internationally well-known English clubs.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The ‘Taylor Report’, led by Lord Justice Taylor aimed to determine the causes of the disaster which occurred on 15 th of April 1989 at Hillsborough (Shef-
field), when 95 Liverpool supporters were crushed to death at a game between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, in the semi-finals of the English FA Chal-
lenge Cup. From this report, it was ruled that steel barriers should be removed from stadia and stadia should provide all seated accommodation. 
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3 Research methodology 
3.1 Data set and methodological procedures 
The situation of European listed sport companies, especially large football clubs, is particularly interesting to test the influence 
of cases of corruption on their stock market performance, for three reasons: (1) the economic power and international recogni-
tion of clubs at the top of European football; (2) episodes arising from corruption (not always proven and legally punished) 
with forecast impact on the economic and sporting performance of those same clubs; and (3) investor behaviour of supporters 
of major European football clubs. 
The previous literature review allowed us to identify a matter of investigation which is unexplored until now, i.e. what is the 
importance assumed by exogenous shocks related to cases of corruption, not only in terms of mechanisms for propagating 
crisis but also as a function of investor behaviour by investors and supporters. To answer this question, with this approach we 
aim to analyse whether the Calciocaos corruption case caused the occurrence of mechanisms of crisis propagation between the 
Dow Jones Stoxx Football (DJSF) Index and stocks of European listed football clubs integrating the benchmark referred to.  
With this purpose, secondary data
4
 was collected, considering the following selection criteria of stocks: (i) the relative im-
portance of the stock in composition of the index (see table 1); (ii) the availability and consistency of daily data to make up 
time series; and (iii) non-observance of situations of suspension of quotation, for several consecutive days, motivated by 
anomalous situations, increases in capital or dividend distribution. 
Table 1 European listed football clubs and percentage weight in composition of the Dow Jones Stoxx Football Index 
European Football Clubs Country Percentage 
Borussia Dortmund Germany 8.5477 
Juventus Italy 6.9554 
Tottenham Hotspur England 4.9256 
AS Roma Italy 4.0237 
Celtic Scotland 2.7594 
AFC Ajax    The Netherlands 2.3141 
Birmingham City England 1.1942 
Sheffield United England 1.0406 
Sporting Clube de Portugal Portugal 0.8078 
Futebol Clube do Porto  Portugal 0.4220 
Source: http://www.stoxx.com/ 
 
According to the selection criteria, 10 stocks were considered when forming the database: Juventus (JUVE); Borussia Dort-
mund (BVB); Tottenham (TOT); Ajax (AJAX); Celtic (CELT); AS Roma (ROM); Sheffield United (SHEF); Birmingham 
(BMC); F.C. Porto (FCP); and Sporting C.P. (SCP)
5
. 
Following the assumptions used in the studies by Eun & Shim (1989), Koch & Koch (1991), and Yang & Bessler (2008), the 
analysis was made based on the daily closing quotations of each stock and the index, in the period from 20 September 2002 to 
7 May 2008, making a total sample of 1430 daily observations. Following the methodology of Khalid & Kawai (2003) and 
Miralles & Miralles (2003), the data are expressed in the local currency, and subject to logarithmic transformation so as to 
align the series and give a greater subsequent convergence of the coefficients obtained through forecasting techniques. 
                                                 
4 Data source: http://investing.businessweek.com. 
5 To designate the different stocks, we use the abbreviations of the original notation appearing in the data source. 
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As in the procedure adopted in the study by Yang & Bessler (2008), the sample was divided in two sub-samples
6
. The first 
sub-sample covers the pre-Calciocaos period (i.e. before the initial announcement of corruption in Italian football) and forms a 
total of 919 daily observations. The second sub-sample concerns the post-Calciocaos period and is made up of 511 daily ob-
servations
7
. 
3.2 Econometric method 
3.2.1 The cointegrated VAR model 
The CVAR model employed in the present paper provides the possibility of identifying long-term economic relationships and 
carrying out dynamic analyses (Juselius, 2007). The econometric methodology follows an outline of four procedures: (1) selec-
tion of an initial model specification; (2) study of the integration order of the variables; (3) estimation process of the CVAR 
model; and (4) dynamic analysis. 
According to Sims (1980), the VAR model allows determination of the inter-relationships between a set of endogenous varia-
bles considered in a system. The advantage of using the VAR model is based on the capacity to analyze the dynamic response 
of endogenous variables, related to exogenous shocks, through two forecasting techniques: (i) decomposition of the variance of 
the prediction error; and (ii) impulse-response functions.  
The VAR model, by not making a distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables, makes the exlusion restrictions 
used to identify the traditional models of simultaneous equations cease to make sense. As an alternative, Watson (1994) used 
sets of restrictions which normally involve the error co-variance matrix. A VAR model of the p order can be expressed as fol-
lows: 
tptpttt XAXAXAmX   ...2211        (1);                                                                                                   
where:   is a vector of independent terms;    is a coefficient matrix of the kxk type; and    is an error correction vector of the 
kx1 type, satisfying that: (i) E(  )   , then each error term is 0; (ii) E(  ,   )  , assuming that the co-variance matrix   as 
defined is positive; and (iii) E(  ,     )  , not being correlated in series. 
The VAR(p) process with k variables can be represented as follows: 
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To make a re-parameterization of the VAR(p) model, we consider a model with an error correction mechanism, which is ex-
pressed as follows:  
tt
p
i
itt XXX   


 1
1
1          (3); 
where:   is the matrix of short-term relationships,   is the matrix representing long-term relationships (its rank r indicates the 
number of cointegrating vectors);   is the differentiation operator; and   is constant.  
If   0, then there are no stationary linear combinations, so the     variable is not co-integrated. If the rank (r) of   is above 0, 
then there will be r possibilities of stationary linear combinations and   can therefore be decomposed in two matrixes   and   
(each of the m r type), and so       and the error correction mechanism is expressed as follows: 
                                                 
6 The first sub-sample includes quotations of stocks in the period 20 September 2002 to 2 May 2006. The second concerns the period 3 May 2006 to 7 May 
2008. 
7 For information about selected descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables, see Table A of Appendix 1 (for the pre-Calciocaos period) 
and Table B of Appendix 2 (for the post-Calciocaos period). 
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According to the previously stated decision rule and supported by the principle of maximum likelihood, we carry out two con-
trasts by calculating two statistics: (i) trace 
 Trace ; and (ii) maximum auto-value  Max . 
The first statistic tests the null hypothesis of the number of co-integration vectors being equal to r, against the alternative hy-
pothesis of the number of co-integration vectors being r+1, according to the following process: 
 


k
ri
iTrace T
1
1loglog 
          (5); 
whereas the second statistic tests the null hypothesis of the number of vectors being greater than r, against the alternative hy-
pothesis of being r+1, being expressed as follows: 
 iMax T   1log            (6); 
in which: T is the number of observations; and    are estimated own values (i.e. the Eigenvalues), being arranged in decreasing 
order.  
If divergence is found in the results obtained through calculation of the two previous statistics, Johansen (1991) and Kasa 
(1992) suggest taking, above all, the trace statistic 
 Trace , in the decision not to reject, or to reject, the null hypothesis.  
 
3.2.2 The initial model specification 
Model specification is represented by a system of twelve equations, considering all the variables as endogenous, and is repre-
sented as follows: 
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     (7); 
in which: JUVEt; BVBt; TOTt; AJAXt; CELTt,; ROMt; SHEFt; BMCt; FCPt;  and SCPt; designate the variables referring to the 
performance of the stocks of European listed football clubs: and the DJSFt serves to note the Dow Jones Stoxx Football index. 
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The dummy variable noted by DUMMYt, takes a value of 1, when there is greater volatility of the stocks of Italian clubs, 
namely JUVE and ROM, having a value of 0, in the other periods
8
. 
 
3.2.3 The integration order of the variables 
The first step in determining the type of relationship between the variables under analysis is to carry out a test of unit roots, 
with the aim of determining the integration order of the time series. To check the existence, or non-existence, of unit roots, we 
use the three following test procedures: (i) the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test; (ii) the Philips-Perron (PP) test; and (iii) 
the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test
9
. 
The ADF test corresponds to a parametric correction consisting of adding the lagged terms of the      variable, aiming to cor-
rect the higher order correlation, and is expressed as follows: 
tptptttt XXXXtX    1122111      (8) 
Application of the ADF (   test aims to test the null hypothesis  : γ = 0; against the alternative hypothesis  : γ <0. If γ is not 
significant, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that the variable is not stationary (i.e. integrated 
in p order) or that it presents a unit root (Dickey & Fuller 1979).  
The non-parametric approach originally proposed by Phillips & Perron (1988) can also be used to deal with the problem of 
autocorrelation in    . For this purpose, the following auto-regressive process should be followed: 
ttt XtX   1            (9) 
Asymptotic distribution of the estimated regression coefficients, as well as their t-ratio depends on the parameters    and   
 . In 
practice      and   
  are not known, and for this reason we continue with their consistent estimation (see table 2). 
Unlike the previously presented tests, the KPSS test considers the null hypothesis of stationary series, against the alternative 
hypothesis of non-stationary series (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). 
Table 2 Tests of Unit Roots, with constant and tendency 
      First differences     
Stocks   pre-Calciocaos  post-Calciocaos 
  ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
DJSF -14.16* -23.47* 0.03* -20.59* -20.85* 0.10* 
JUVE -27.58* -27.68* 0.09* -15.36* -20.14* 0.07* 
BVB -33.99* -34.50* 0.03* -24.84* -25.03* 0.04* 
TOT -24.99* -34.50* 0.05* -15.76* -15.76* 0.10* 
AJAX -19.51* -39.20* 0.14* -17.35* -44.96* 0.05* 
CELT -25.58* -26.35* 0.10* -17.40* -15.94* 0.20 
ROM -29.63* -29.64* 0.07* -22.50* -22.65* 0.06* 
SHEF -25.51* -25.16* 0.10* -20.93* -20.93* 0.05* 
BMC -25.68* -25.68* 0.14* -21.79* -21.91* 0.05* 
FCP -23.51* -30.06* 0.07* -18.04* -38.28* 0.04* 
SCP -35.16* -35.80* 0.03* -17.53* -52.32* 0.07* 
Legend: * Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of containing a unit root. 
                                                 
8 Specification of the model used to analyze the performance of stocks in the pre-Calciocaos period does not include the dummy variable, as there is no need 
to make a correction of volatility.  
9 According to the results from application of the ADF test, PP test and KPSS test, all the variables present statistical significance in the pre-Calciocaos period, 
except the AJAX stock which only shows statistical significance when considering 5 lags). In the post-Calciocaos period, we find that all variables present 
statistical significance, except the CELT stock. 
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First, we study integration of the time series. From this, some series are transformed by differentiation to estimate the models 
only with variables I(1). After this differentiation, the null hypothesis is rejected, i.e. the stationarity of the series is confirmed, 
and they are integrated in order 1 (or I(1)). 
 
3.2.4 The estimation process of the CVAR model 
In the estimation process, first we select the optimal number of lags (pmax), from five criteria of information. After confirmation 
of non-existence of error autocorrelation through carrying out the LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test, and considering the results of 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC), we find that the CVAR model should be estimated with two lags for both periods (see 
table 3). 
Table 3 Selection of the Optimal Number of Lags 
Lags LR FPE AIC SBC HQ 
  pre-Calciocaos 
0 - 7.53e-21 -1.511.901 -1.506.108 -1.509.690 
1 35046.89 1.37e-37 -5.366.615 -52.97096* -53.40079* 
2 3.142.641 1.25e-37* -53.75398* -5.242.153 -5.324.538 
3 161.0417* 1.36e-37 -5.367.229 -5.170.259 -5.292.045 
4 1.408.036 1.51e-37 -5.356.966 -5.096.270 -5.257.457 
  post-Calciocaos 
0 - 1.69e-26 -2.528.695 -2.518.687 -2.524.770 
1 16350.28 1.26e-40 -5.781.664 -56.51556* -57.30641* 
2 3.757.876 1.02e-40* -58.02824* -5.552.616 -5.704.701 
3 245.9051* 1.07e-40 -5.798.339 -5.428.032 -5.653.118 
4 1.399.792 1.40e-40 -5.772.098 -5.281.691 -5.579.777 
Legend: Likelihood-Ratio (LR); Final Prediction Error (FPE); Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC); and 
Hannah-Quinn (HQ) Criterion. * Shows the optimal number of lags selected for each criterion. 
 
 
To determine the existence of co-integration relationships, we used the test procedure proposed by Johansen & Juselius (1990). 
The principle of maximum likelihood forces us to take into account the values of the trace statistic 
 Trace  and the maximum 
auto-value statistic 
 Max . 
According to the values observed in the first line of the tests presented in Table 4, we reject the first null hypothesis of non-
existence of co-integration among variables. For the remaining test lines, we find the values observed are less than the critical 
values, and therefore the null hypothesis is not rejected. In this way, we see that for both the pre-Calciocaos period and the 
post-Calciocaos period there is only one co-integration vector, which is considered in estimation of the CVAR model with 
inclusion of two error correction terms: ECT1 (in the pre-Calciocaos period); and ECT2 (in the post-Calciocaos period). 
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Table 4 Cointegration relationships: Johansen & Juselius (1990) test 
Eigenvalues Hypotheses 
Trace  
H0 H1 Observed Critical 
 pre-Calciocaos 
0.0745 r=0 r=1 286.0826* 285.1425 
0.0508 r=1 r=2 215.2058 239.2354 
0.0430 r=2 r=3 167.4947 197.3709 
 post-Calciocaos 
0.166448 r=0 r=1 367.0855* 334.9837 
0.126384 r=1 r=2 274.5997 285.1425 
0.103018 r=2 r=3 205.9617 239.2354 
 
Eigenvalues Hypotheses 
Max  
H0 H1 Observed Critical 
 pre-Calciocaos 
0.0745 r=0 r>0 70.8767* 70.5351 
0.0508 r≤1 r>1 47.7111 64.5047 
0.0430 r≤2 r>2 40.2686 58.4335 
 post-Calciocaos 
0.166448 r=0 r>0 92.4858* 76.5784 
0.126384 r≤1 r>1 68.6381 70.5351 
0.103018 r≤2 r>2 55.2298 64.5047 
 
Legend: * Shows rejection of the null hypothesis, at 5% significance.  
Note: The critical values of the trace and maximum auto-value statistics, which are presented for a level of 5% significance, were taken from 
Osterwald-Lenum (1992).  
 
 
4. Results and discussion  
In dynamic analysis of the inter-relationships formed between the performance of European listed football club stocks, ECTs 
are necessarily incorporated.  
To investigate the existence of relationships of causality between the variables representing stocks, we use the concept origi-
nally proposed by Granger (1969). In the causality tests, we present the results obtained from calculation of the Wald statistics 
referring to each pair of variables included in the dynamic system of simultaneous equations.  
The results are supplied through a dynamic analysis that includes assessment of relationships of causality and analysis of the 
residuals of each equation of the dynamic system of simultaneous equations.  
Dynamic analysis based only on the results obtained from the Granger causality tests may be sufficient. According to Sims 
(1980), Goux (1996), Lütkepohl (1999, 2004) and Juselius (2007), this type of analysis should be complemented with use of 
two forecasting techniques: decomposition of the prediction error variance and impulse-response functions. 
Discussion of the results is structured according to the two sub-samples referring to the pre-Calciocaos and post-Calciocaos 
periods.   
 
4.1. The pre-Calciocaos period 
In the pre-Calciocaos period, we find unidirectional and bidirectional relationships of causality (see table 5). Regarding the 
bidirectional relationships, we detect a pair made up of the JUVE and SCP stocks. The DSJF and FCP stocks are completely 
exogenous, since they do not present a relationship of causality with other variables. Concerning ECT1, the coefficients refer-
ring to TOT, CELT, ROM, SHEF, BMC and SCP are significant, carrying out the adjustment mechanism in relation to the 
deviations in the long-term balance relationships.  
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The joint causality of the block is detected for the AJAX and CELT variables, at a level of 5% significance, and for the JUVE 
and ROM variables, at 10% significance, which confirms the importance of including this block of variables in the model spec-
ification. 
The importance of SCP should be stressed since it is the origin of causality for the JUVE and BVB stocks for a level of signifi-
cance of 5%. The lesser importance of the TOT stock is also of note, since it does not originate any relationship of causality, 
despite being explained by past values of the CELT stock. 
 
Table 5 Granger’s Causality contrasts: pre-Calciocaos sub-sample 
                                                              
      - 1.9386 0.5269 0.4508 1.2072* 1.9922 1.7934 1.5979 0.8268 0.3220 0.5024 
      1.6150 - 3.2713 3.0167 1.0161 5.1347** 2.8825 0.4900 2.2940 1.2602 1.0107* 
     1.7331 5.4126** - 1.2302 3.7609 3.4585 2.0119 0.0950 0.3669 3.1563 3.3396 
     0.9129 3.6561 0.6998 - 3.8215 2.7459 2.9313 0.2035 0.0546 0.7116 2.0430 
      1.3003 1.9549 0.4112 0.2065 - 7.9731* 4.2206 1.0916 2.9276 1.0449 1.3173 
       4.0403 0.5356 0.2151 5.4646** 0.8448 - 0.4564 1.0007 1.2114 0.6538 1.3828 
      3.8206 0.7471 4.9200** 1.3315 1.5240 6.1868* - 2.7034 1.8433 1.5338 0.2751 
       0.5950 1.7218 0.7519 0.9586 0.9160 1.1707* 0.8335 - 0.9395 0.6523 1.4084 
      0.0337 0.2534 2.5837 0.1800 3.2507 8.2591* 0.4975 1.7299 - 2.3897 0.1334 
      0.9734 4.4967 3.3320 0.5241 0.0166 3.8397 1.0852* 3.1782 1.1122 - 5.1443** 
      0.5847 8.8149* 6.4368* 1.9409 1.8336 0.4370 2.2231 0.5873 1.0230 3.0037 - 
Block 16.8036 29.1034** 21.4095 15.1021 31.5960* 48.4757* 28.8984** 11.6884 15.7770 14.3919 23.4862 
ECT1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0021* 0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0026* 0.0029* 0.0027* 0.0000 -0.0023* 
Notes:  
- Consider the variable or block expressed in each column as being the independent variable (origin of causality), and the variable presented 
horizontally as being the dependent variable (destination of causality) 
- Causality contrasts of the variables are carried out by applying the
2
statistic, with a degree of freedom, while contrasts of the signifi-
cance of the error correction term (ECT) are carried out by applying the t statistic. 
* Level of significance: 5%; ** Level of significance: 10%. 
 
 
Table 6 presents only the results concerning statistically significant relationships of causality. We use the Cholesky decomposi-
tion of the prevision error variance and the coefficients obtained with simulation of impulse-response functions. 
 
Table 6 Analysis of causality directions: pre-Calciocaos sub-sample 
Direction of causality   Forecasting  8 weeks 24 weeks 40 weeks Sign  
     →       CVD 0.24 0.20 0.19 - 
  AIRF -0.0064 -0.0081 -0.0026  
     →        CVD 0.25 0.09 0.06 - 
  AIRF -0.0109 -0.0017 -0.0112  
     →       CVD 0.40 0.64 0.69 + 
   AIRF 0.0143 0.0114 -0.0067  
     →      CVD 1.86 2.83 3.04 - 
   AIRF -0.0011 0.0159 0.0428  
     →      CVD 0.01 0.01 0.01 + 
   AIRF 0.0016 0.0079 0.0114  
      →       CVD 0.06 0.06 0.06 - 
   AIRF 0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0142  
      →       CVD 0.04 0.05 0.06 + 
   AIRF 0.0063 0.0401 0.0847  
      →       CVD 0.00 0.00 0.00 + 
   AIRF 0.0010 0.0095 0.0218  
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     →       CVD 3.73 5.16 5.47 + 
   AIRF 0.0145 0.0944 0.1975  
      →       CVD 3.39 4.32 4.51 + 
   AIRF 0.0149 0.0919 0.1886  
     →     *   CVD 5.03 6.83 7.19 + 
   AIRF 0.0083 0.0717 0.1591  
     →      CVD 0.41 0.48 0.50 + 
   AIRF 0.0053 0.0217 0.0399  
     →      CVD 1.03 1.00 0.99 - 
   AIRF -0.0126 -0.0203 -0.0149  
     →      CVD 0.02 0.01 0.01 + 
    AIRF 0.0039 0.0081 0.0100   
 
Notes:  DVC is the Cholesky Variance Decomposition; AIRF is Accumulated Impulse-Response Function.  
The causality sign is obtained from the accumulated value of the 10 week coefficients, since from that period coefficients reach the necessary 
stability (Goux, 1996).  
 
Considering analysis of causality directions based on Cholesky’s forecasting technique of decomposition of the forecast error 
variance, we find the direction of causality      →      is significant, as in a period of eight weeks, the impact of the 
BMC stock on the CELT stock is around 5%, with a persistent and growing character, reaching around 7% and 7.19%, for 
periods of 24 and 40 weeks respectively. Making an analysis of the coefficients of the impulse-response functions, we find the 
sign of causality is positive. 
 
4.2 The post-Calciocaos period 
In the post-Calciocaos period, we again find unidirectional and bidirectional causality between stocks and the benchmark index 
(see Table 7). From the results obtained with the Granger causality contrasts, only the TOT, CELT, SHEF and BMC variables 
can be considered completely exogenous. We also find feedback relationships between the DJSF and JUVE variables, between 
DJSF and BVB, between BVB and JUVE, DSJF and SCP, and between DUMMY and JUVE. However, some of these feed-
back relationships are detected at different levels of significance. There are bidirectional relationships between the JUVE and 
BVB, and JUVE and DUMMY variables at a level of 5% statistical significance. 
Besides, we observe that the BVB and SCP variables, at a level of 5% statistical significance, determine the behaviour of the 
DJSF benchmark index. In turn, BVB determines the behaviour of JUVE, which lets us conclude that BVB has enormous 
importance in determining the performance of the benchmark index (DJSF) and the JUVE stock, associated with the corruption 
case in the post-Calciocaos period.  
The block of variables determines performance of the JUVE, AJAX and FCP stocks; at a level of statistical significance of 
10%. This result contributes to confirming the importance of including the variables selected for model specification. 
Regarding ECT2, the coefficients of the DJSF, JUVE, AJAX, ASR, FCP and SCP stocks ensure operation of the adjustment 
mechanism related to deviations in long-term balance relationships.  
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Table 7 Granger’s Causality contrasts: post-Calciocaos sub-sample 
                                                                     
      - 5.2457** 9.6184* 1.2727 0.0037 0.0305 0.0541 1.077 3.0846 1.4124 8.4413* 1.5714 
      6.1997* - 8.6377* 0.1355 0.3538 0.0923 4.8821** 0.1623 0.2273 2.619 4.5294 6.8448* 
     6.1137* 4.6388** - 0.3657 2.2791 1.5776 0.1861 3.8773 4.4608 1.9418 1.1755 6.2922* 
     6.1731 0.1025 0.9378 - 2.7636 1.0126 1.0133 0.9767 1.9683 0.9878 0.2274 0.0246 
      1.7527 1.1362 0.2693 3.3482 - 0.0889 3.3341* 7.3071 2.2105 0.2328 6.3751 0.0178 
      1.2682 0.2458 0.5399 2.7894 0.4522 - 0.5059 0.1842 2.5724 1.3774 1.0487 0.0135 
     3.6031 3.8333 1.6868 2.5144 0.9548 0.0519 - 1.6143 2.2082 1.6545 4.1768 0.0112 
      1.0513 2.1143 2.4682 2.4251 4.1535 0.3353 0.8356 - 0.5025 2.0048 1.2183 0.0482 
     8.8051* 4.433 3.3775 3.978 6.8228* 4.5897 0.0468 1.0358 - 5.7897* 0.4605 0.0529 
     1.5544 0.2915 0.9591 2.8044 5.5822 0.8816 0.3137 1.549 2.2435 - 2.777 0.1658 
     5.7161** 2.1794 0.3588 2.3442 6.2895 1.3556 0.3595 3.0147 0.6331 1.0395** - 0.0882 
       3.7798 1.0105* 1.0945 0.2286 2.9977* 2.7944 0.2599 1.5229 0.0631 0.1763 1.9693 - 
Block 42.9643 32.1512** 24.038 21.6017 32.2662** 12.5752 20.8897 21.502 18.4467 32.3984** 24.5193 14.4354 
ECT1 -0.0133* -0.0286* -0.007 -0.005 -0.0205* -0.0079 -0.0777* -0.017 -0.0131 -0.0251* 0.0290* -0.011393 
Notes: * Level of significance: 5%; ** Level of significance: 10%. 
 
As in the procedure followed before, the results of the analysis of causality directions in Table 8 presented below show statisti-
cally significant causality relationships.  
 
Table 8 Analysis of causality directions: post-Calciocaos sub-sample 
Direction of causality   Forecasting  8 weeks 24 weeks 40 weeks Sign 
      →     *   CVD 25.01 24.9 24.88 + 
   AIRF 0.1326 0.398 0.6629  
             CVD 1.79 1.8 1.8 + 
   AIRF 0.02 0.0605 0.1009  
             CVD 2.99 2.93 2.92 + 
   AIRF 0.0349 0.1051 0.1748  
     →        CVD 3.08 3.09 3.09 + 
   AIRF 0.0497 0.1581 0.2663  
    →     *   CVD 10.19 10.97 11.13 + 
   AIRF 0.0205 0.0703 0.1203  
      →        CVD 1.05 1.04 1.04 + 
   AIRF 0.0074 0.0244 0.0414   
     →       CVD 0.02 0.01 0.01 - 
  AIRF -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0047  
       →     *   CVD 7.36 7.44 7.45 + 
   AIRF 0.1294 0.4083 0.6872  
      →      CVD 0.2 0.19 0.18 + 
  AIRF 0.0074 0.0113 0.0184  
     →       CVD 0.32 0.33 0.33 - 
   AIRF -0.0085 -0.0391 -0.0698  
     →        CVD 2.52 2.62 2.63 - 
   AIRF -0.0353 -0.0841 -0.2349  
       →       CVD 0.34 0.35 0.35 - 
  AIRF -0.0235 -0.0841 -0.1449  
     →       CVD 1.17 1.21 1.21 - 
   AIRF -0.0224 -0.0809 -0.1397  
      →      CVD 0.01 0.01 0.01 + 
   AIRF 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0019  
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    →       CVD 0.01 0.01 0.01 + 
   AIRF 0.0088 0.0476 0.0878  
     →    *   CVD 22.66 23.94 24.2 + 
   AIRF 0.0349 0.1082 0.1817  
      →    *   CVD 11.32 12.12 12.28 + 
   AIRF 0.0133 0.0706 0.1296  
     →         CVD 1.98 1.94 1.94 - 
    AIRF -0.0361 -0.1107 -0.1844  
 
Notes:   
DVC is the Cholesky Variance Decomposition; AIRF is Accumulated Impulse Response Function. The causality sign is obtained from the 
accumulated value of the 10 week coefficients, since from that period coefficients reach the necessary stability (Goux, 1996).  
*Shows that the direction of causality analysed presents a significant impact, i.e. over 5% after 8 weeks (Goux, 1996). 
 
Analysis of causality directions shows that five causality relationships indicate the existence of direct significant impacts, 
namely:     →     ;       →             →             →    ; and       →     . For these same relation-
ships of causality, bidirectional directions of causality are detected in the cases:     →      and       →    , i.e. SCP 
determines the performance of the DJSF benchmark index, and in turn the DJSF determines performance of the SCP stock. 
According to the results obtained from the Cholesky variance decomposition, concerning the causality relationship 
    →       the explanatory weight in decomposition of the prediction error is around 11%, while for the causality relation-
ship       →     it reaches 12%, in the three forecast periods (8, 24 and 40 weeks).  According to the coefficients obtained 
for the impulse-response functions, both causality relationships have a positive sign. 
Performance of the SCP stock also has a positive and significant impact on the performance of the FCP stock. The first ex-
plains 23% of the prediction error variance of the FCP stock after 8 weeks, and around 24%, after 24 and 40 weeks. 
Regarding the causality direction       →     , for the three forecast periods, the explanatory weight is around 25%, the 
causality sign being positive. Therefore, despite expecting a negative impact arising from the corruption episode, this does not 
happen, the JUVE stock having a direct and significant impact of 25% on performance of the DJSF benchmark index.   
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper analysed the impact of the Calciocaos corruption episode on the performance of European listed football clubs and 
the Dow Jones Stoxx Football index benchmark. In addition, it analysed in dynamic terms the relationships of causality be-
tween stocks in two distinct periods: pre-Calciocaos and post-Calciocaos; finding significant differences in the pattern of these 
relationships.  
In this context, we underline that, despite the Italian JUVE stock being directly involved in the corruption episode, besides 
continuing to contribute substantially to the composition of the DJSF, it began to determine positively, in causal terms, the 
performance of the benchmark index.  
Moreover, dynamic analysis of Calciocaos showed that corruption episodes involving listed football clubs may stimulate emo-
tional behaviour by investors who are simultaneously supporters, since in fact they do not sell their participations. Further-
more, investor reaction is characterized by a substantial increase in the explanatory power of the JUVE stock on the perfor-
mance of the DJSF. Nevertheless, this positive impact may also be related to substantial amounts of money obtained at the 
time from selling important international players to other leading European football clubs, such as Real Madrid F.C. and F.C. 
Internazionale Milano.  
In addition, and somewhat surprisingly, we found that the explanatory power of the Portuguese SCP stock on performance of 
the benchmark index increased substantially, after transmission of the shock generated by the Calciocaos corruption episode. 
However, this may be justified by the fact that SCP has been capitalizing its image and international prestige in recent years, 
through developing young talent which is later sold to clubs in the elite of European football. 
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From comparative analysis of the results obtained for the two sub-samples, it is possible to produce two fundamental insights. 
Firstly, in the pre-Calciocaos period, relationships as a whole between stocks are not statistically significant, except for the 
relationship between BMC and CELT. However, there is a relationship of interdependence between JUVE and SCP, since 
these stocks present a relationship of bidirectional causality. Nevertheless, the DJSF index is completely exogenous, being self-
explanatory, i.e. no stock has a significant impact on performance of the index. 
Secondly, in the post-Calciocaos period, there was an increase in the number of bidirectional causality relationships between 
the stocks with the greatest weighting in composition of the benchmark index, as well as between the index and those same 
stocks. The public announcement of the corruption episode in the Italian A Series, which involved Juventus directly, had an 
impact on stock performance, since we find that JUVE and SCP stocks began to determine strongly performance of the 
benchmark index. 
Faced with these results, we see that the Calciocaos corruption case had an impact on the stock performance of listed European 
football clubs, as well as on a new composition of causality relationships and causal determination of shock transmission 
mechanisms, from the time the corruption case, the subject of this study, went public. 
As the main limitation of this study, we point to the impossibility of obtaining more information about other stocks included in 
the DJSF reference index, in order to increase the size of the sample and its representative character, and then we could have 
checked for the existence of contagion and the type of contagion (for example, shift contagion), through alternative tests that 
use, for example, correlation coefficients and other estimation methods: ARCH, GARCH, Probit and Copula Distributions. 
In terms of implications for policy-makers, we suggest they prepare new regulatory actions that allow anticipation and warning 
of new corruption episodes involving listed football clubs. In our opinion, one of the proposed innovations concerning regula-
tion could be based on intensive use of new technology in the activity of refereeing and supervising sporting competitions held 
in Europe.  
For practitioners and managers interested in the continuous improvement of listed football clubs’ performance, we warn of the 
need to guarantee a critical mass of young investors/fans, as it is they who stimulate sustainable success in sporting companies, 
from a longitudinal and inter-generational perspective.       
It is suggested that future investigations explore the issue of sentimental behaviour by investors, following a behavioural ap-
proach, which would allow exploration through recourse to experimental methods and individual data, of a better understand-
ing of supporters’ investment strategies, when faced with anomalous situations such as cases of corruption or even situations of 
announced insolvency of listed football clubs.   
Finally, we suggest carrying out an empirical study of contagion channels between stocks quoted on the DJSF benchmark 
index, having as common denominator the comparative analysis of other corruption episodes in Europe and South America 
(for example, Argentina and Brazil) with the aim of contrasting the respective impacts on performance of the DJSF index and 
on a new composition of shock propagation mechanisms between the different stocks of main listed football clubs in the conti-
nents of Europe and America. 
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